Introduction export markets, the fact remains that the alleged benefits for these economies are far from certain. What is more, it is rather odd that the Commission is seeking to develop a model of poverty-reduction based on non-reciprocal trade preferences when it chose to abandon such a model in the case of the ACP group in favour of reciprocal trade deals, the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (see en. 7). Although the idea of 'differentiating' between developing countries is not entirely new to EU trade policy, the lack of a coherent development rationale for the recent GSP reform begs two important questions. Firstly, what is driving these changes to the scheme and, secondly, what does this reform say about the broader 'trade-development' nexus in EU policy that authors have begun explicitly writing about (e.g. Young and Peterson 2013) ?
In response to the first question, I situate the GSP reform within the broader crisis landscape, where policymakers in DG Trade are increasingly concerned with showing that trade (liberalisation) 'works'. In this vein, their policy discourse of late has been rife with an emphasis on 'reciprocity'. This may seem at first like a turn to mercantilism (understood here as a concern with maximising net exports) and consequently also the interests of protectionists. However, a closer reading of EU policy as well as interviews with Commission officials and interest group representatives 1 suggest that the references to reciprocity actually betray a strong desire to enhance the EU's trade negotiating leverage. I interpret the GSP reform as just one (albeit significant) attempt to recapture lost leverage with emerging economies with which the EU has been negotiating flagship free trade gareements (FTAs) following the 2006 Global Europe communication.
This finding naturally raises broader implications for the study of the 'trade-development' nexus; the GSP reform appears to be driven by commercial interests to which developmental considerations have been subordinated. As a result, one of the broader contributions of this article is to challenge the idea of a uniquely 'normative power Europe' intent on exporting its progressive values and which acts in a development-friendly fashion (e.g. Manners 2008 ).
Indeed, and echoing the sentiments of this literature, policymakers have been keen to stress the differences between supposedly 'developmental' and 'commercial' trade policymaking, where agreements of the former type (e.g. with the ACP) are said to be driven by distinct imperatives when compared to agreements of the latter type (say with emerging markets) (e.g. Commission 2009, p. 1) . Such views have also been implicitly supported by the scholarly literature on the trade-development nexus; this has tended to focus on institutional conflicts between bureaucracies within the Commission -especially between DG Trade and DG Development -which allegedly embody these distinct imperatives (see Holland and Doidge 2012) .
In contrast, I argue that there is evidence to suggest that the EU's external economic diplomacy is not much unlike that of its allegedly more hard-nosed rivals (e.g. the United
States or China). In doing so, I align myself with a number of authors who have sought to move beyond the institutional determinants of EU external policymaking and begun to situate its study within the wider discipline of political economy (see De Bièvre and Poletti 2013).
What has mattered to such scholars in particular, following a voluminous literature in the field, is how the balance of domestic-societal interests is an important determinant of trade policy outcomes, with exporters seen as key drivers of the EU's offensive trade agenda embodied by Global Europe (Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012) . 2 In this article, I also find that the influence of political economic interests has been an important determinant of the GSP reform, with exporters being key drivers of the EU's recent leverage agenda. Indeed, the notion of 'reciprocity' is understood to be a key underlying feature in the political economy literature on international trade negotiations, often seen as necessary to mobilise exporters in favour of trade liberalisation and thus offset protectionist interests (e.g. Gilligan, 1997) .
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section I provide an overview of the evolution of EU trade and development policy since the start of the crisis, before discussing the specifics of the GSP reform. The third section challenges the Commission's rationale for the reform, arguing that the new regulation has to be interpreted as a move to subordinate developmental policy objectives to the needs of enhancing trade-negotiating leverage. The fourth section then turns to the interest group politics behind the drafting and approval of the GSP reform, finding that the views of exporters were privileged over those of importers, import-competing sectors and development-minded Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs). The final section concludes, offering some thoughts on the exposure of EU development policy to commercial imperatives.
EU trade and development policy since the start of the crisis: reforming the GSP scheme 3
Since the start of the crisis, there has been a move towards consolidating the EU's offensive FTA agenda. This had been initiated earlier -in the context of the stagnation of the Doha rationale. This is a point I return to below, after having considered the design of this new regulation.
'Income' and 'product' graduation
The new GSP regulation was adopted in October 2012 and is due to enter into force in The final key innovation is a series of changes to the graduation principle for GSP imports.
Under the old regulation, products were grouped into 21 so-called 'sections' (or groups of products). If any country's exports under GSP for a particular product section exceeded the so-called 'graduation threshold' -15 per cent of the total EU GSP imports for a particular section (12.5 per cent for textiles) -they were no longer eligible for GSP (on the basis that such products were competitive enough to establish a foothold in the EU market). In this respect, the new GSP regulation makes it easier for products to be graduated ('product graduation', again to use the term from ODI 2011) for two reasons. Firstly, even though the relevant threshold values will be increased to 17.5 per cent and 14.5 per cent for textiles, the number of product categories will expand to 32 (meaning smaller categories). Secondly, the value of total imports used to calculate market share (the so-called 'denominator') will decrease given the significant reduction in the number GSP beneficiaries. As a result of the increased ease with which imports could therefore surpass thresholds, 5.3 billion euro worth of trade (2009 data Moreover, an ODI study from 2011 found that there was significant potential for an additional two countries (Iraq and Vietnam) to lose preferences from product graduation (ODI 2011, p. 7) .
Interrogating the Commission's rationale: the GSP changes as an instrument of leverage 5
As noted in the framing communication on Trade, Growth and Development, the Commission and its officials have maintained that the reform is intended to 'focus the GSP preferences on the countries most in need' (Commission 2011a, p. 2) . These are, in their eyes, LDCs and so-called 'vulnerable economies' (those lacking product diversification and being poorly integrated into the world economy; see Commission 2011b, p. 11), the respective recipients of the 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) and GSP+ schemes. 6 Based on the analysis of a study it had commissioned, the Commission has argued that the main beneficiaries of GSP were in fact emerging economies with increasingly competitive sectors, at the expense of countries in greater need of preferences (Commission 2011b, pp. 11-13) . New eligibility criteria were needed so that GSP preferences could be targeted on poorer countries, while the new graduation mechanism would serve to 'weed out the more competitive product sections' among those economies that remained eligible for the scheme (Commission 2011b, p. 24 ).
There are, however, significant reasons for doubting the Commission's stated rationale.
Firstly, it would be using the tools of a development model premised on non-reciprocal preferences which it has explicitly rejected since the 1996 Green Paper on EU-ACP relations (Commission 1996) . This brought to an end the era of one-way trade preferences under Lomé there will be graduation are not ones that lower-income countries export. Moreover, even if a lower-income country does export an affected product, the preference margin afforded by GSP may be insufficient to counter a graduating country's existing export competitiveness.
Finally, even where the preference margins are significant, other, higher income countries are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries of the GSP changes. The report finds that even for products where poorer countries account for at least 5 per cent of EU imports -products in which such states could potentially establish a foothold in the EU market and which could thus contribute to poverty reduction -high-income and upper-middle income countries currently account for almost two-thirds of EU imports (ODI 2011, pp. 12-13) . Very similar findings are echoed in another recent study of the GSP scheme undertaken by the Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS) (Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8) .
Although this does not rule out any beneficial effects for lower-income countries, and is based on static analysis that neglects potential dynamic effects of changing export patterns (as noted by one Commission official) -it does suggest that large-scale benefits of the GSP proposals for this group of states are far from certain, in contrast to more predictable gains from trade diversion for higher-income countries. In this vein, the CARIS study of the GSP scheme found that 'there is little evidence that the EU's preference regimes have led to a diversification of exports into new products' (Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8 Table 1 ).
Moreover, these changes potentially affect exports that would have benefitted substantially from GSP. In India's case, the ODI study estimated that almost half (44.8 per cent) face MFN tariffs of 5 per cent or more, while the equivalent figures are 27.6 per cent for Thailand and a whopping 76.1 for Vietnam (ODI 2011, p. 10; see also Table 1 )! In sum, the countries and products likely to be excluded from GSP are consistent with the objective of boosting the EU's leverage as they significantly impact on the exports of emerging economies the EU is currently negotiating FTAs with (e.g. India and a number of ASEAN Member States). In contrast, the GSP reform's relatively small impact on EU imports suggests that the reform has less to do with protecting EU producers (more on which in the following section). For most of the countries depicted in Table 1 (which provides data on almost all of the top GSP exporters to the EU), affected GSP imports represented less than 1 per cent of total EU imports -including for that persistent bugbear of import-competing sectors, China.
Moreover, in all cases affected GSP trade accounted for a more significant proportion of a trading partner's exports than of EU imports.
In assessing the GSP changes, DG Trade emphasised that these 'ha [d] nothing to do with other [commercial] trade negotiations'. On the same page, however, it also noted that they 'might still have the unintended consequence of providing more advanced developing countries with a greater incentive to enter into and conclude reciprocal trade negotiations with the EU' (Commission 2011b, p. 15) . In this respect DG Trade has consistently singled out India (whose exports, as I noted above, rely heavily on GSP and which stands to lose considerably from graduation); the concern is that while it 'enjoys relatively good market argument was that such countries therefore had the option of maintaining their access to the EU market. In this vein, the press has reported the EU's Ambassador to Thailand lobbying that government to start FTA negotiations in the light of the GSP reform (Pratruangkrai 2012 ). This strategy, moreover, has also begun to bear fruits. Several sources have since noted that the reform has been a key factor in driving Thailand to agree to start FTA negotiations with the EU in March 2013 (the EU's GSP scheme covered 3.58 per cent of Thailand's total exports), with Thai policymakers allegedly keen to complete the trade talks before GSP preferences run out (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013) .
What about protectionists? The interest group politics of the reform 9
Having provided an overview of the GSP changes and shown how they serve the objective of enhancing the EU's negotiating leverage, my aim in this section is to provide an overview of the interest group politics behind the reform. I argue that this not only played an important role in shaping the initial Commission proposal and final regulation, but also helps to underscore my argument that this is about EU leverage rather than protectionism. While my findings in the previous section suggest that the GSP reform will have a greater impact on emerging countries' exports than EU imports (accounting for a far more significant share of the former), the fact remains that the GSP reform still restricts imports. According to some this can be seen to indicate the growing influence of protectionists in trade policy following the Financial Crisis (e.g. Nowakowska 2010 ). The reduction of preference margins for some products of interest to retailers and other importers -such as textiles and clothing (see Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8 ) -could, in particular, be said to be a sign of the marginalisation of such groups at the expense of protectionists, as has happened on other occasions in the EU (De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011). In contrast, I find that while importers may well have been marginalised, the new regulation reflects, to a large extent, the interests of exporters rather than protectionists.
Exporters made their views most apparent to the Commission during a stakeholder consultation exercise held from March to May 2010. The main concern for such businesses was the issue of leverage in negotiations, particularly with India (which, as became apparent above, was also the bugbear of DG Trade officials). As one such organisation representing pan-European business interests was to note: 'GSP undermines the EU's negotiating position in bilateral and especially multilateral trade negotiations because partners already have preferential access to the EU market or they are concerned about preference erosion' (Commission 2010b, p. 4) . More broadly, exporters consistently stressed two things during this consultation. Firstly, they underscored the need to restrict eligibility by excluding higher (and even, in some cases, middle-income countries) from the scheme and, secondly, they requested facilitating the graduation of imports by allowing for the graduation of individual products (see Table 2 ). Although the Commission's initial proposal and the regulation were slightly more moderate than this -excluding only high-income and higher-middle-income countries and increasing the number of product sections rather than allowing for individual product graduation -exporting interests expressed surprise in interviews at the degree to which their requests were reproduced in the Commission's proposal. Moreover, the Commission appears to have privileged their views over the wishes not only of importers (in particular retailers) and European development NGOs but also import-competing interests (notably textile, clothing and leather producers, which were particularly sensitive given the significance of preference margins under GSP, see Gasiorek et al. 2010, p. 8) . Their requests for, respectively, a more open (and less variable) scheme; a maintenance of the existing system and a very restrictive (and extremely responsive) graduation were not significantly reflected in the Commission proposal. As a result, and in contrast to exporters, importcompeting sectors and importers were not completely satisfied with the Commission's May 2011 proposals -even if they were inclined to see, respectively, the benefits of the proposed regulation in terms of restricting imports and providing for greater simplicity and predictability in the EU's import regime. NGOs, for their part, were generally dissatisfied with a regulation they saw as undermining poverty reduction efforts (see Table 2 ).
[insert Table 2 '[t] arget the GSP on the countries that most need it', and doing so by tinkering with product graduation (Commission 2004, p. 7) it also wanted to avoid graduating entire sections on the basis of only a few products (Commission 2004, p. 9) . The 'substance' of the 2005 GSP scheme that came out of these proposals was not altered with the 2008 GSP scheme (Commission 2007, p. 3) but was clearly quite different to the emphasis placed in the most recent reform on creating a greater number of product sections. Indeed, the Commission -echoing the views of business on the matter (Commission 2010b ) -highlighted that under the previous system 'graduation has been barely used' and was therefore 'insufficiently responsive' to the competitiveness of product sections. This, it said, justified the more disaggregated approach to graduation taken in the latest reform (Commission 2011b, p. 16) .
Similarly, while earlier GSP schemes had practised some income graduation this only applied to high income countries that were 'sufficiently diversified in their exports' (i.e. where the have noted above -it also points to the fact that, following the lobbying efforts of exporters, it has taken on an entirely new dimension.
When it came to lobbying the Council and EP over approval of the Commission's proposed changes to the GSP scheme, the impact of those groups that had been dissatisfied with the Commission's initial proposal was also minor. Both the Council and the EP were generally quite favourably-inclined to the proposed changes in terms of 'income' and 'product' graduation (see EP 2012a, pp. 31-3, Council 2012, p. 3) . Where revisions were sought by these two bodies these did not challenge either of these features of the original Commission Taken more broadly, my empirical findings challenge the common EU policymaker narrative that trade and development policy are driven by distinct imperatives or that the EU is a uniquely 'normative power' (see Manners 2008) . Rather, I have shown that the political economic forces shaping trade policies in other entities play an important role in the EU as well, adding to a literature which seeks to situate the study of EU external economic diplomacy within the wider political economy of trade (which has long been attuned to 'reciprocity' as a tool for serving exporters and offsetting protectionist pressures). In a short article such as this there is of course no space to fully explore the implications of such a development -but it does raise questions as to the desirability of the current tradedevelopment nexus. If the EU's primary concern in trade policy is to establish liberal markets which its firms can compete in to what extent can it contribute to the economic development of developing countries, for which it is the most important global provider of market access?
The GSP reform suggests that both objectives are not necessarily compatible as it serves the former much more clearly than the latter. It is thus a stark reminder of the problems associated with the entwinement of commercial and developmental trade policy already brought to the fore by the previous controversy surrounding the EPA negotiations, where critics accused the EU of restricting the policy space available to ACP countries (e.g. Hurt
2003, Langan this issue).
beyond the scope of this article, which seeks to interrogate the underlying reason for the reform (which was initiated by the Commission and driven by its concern for exporter interests).
12 The final substantive change pushed for by the EP and Council was a limited duration of 10 years for the new regulation. The Commission had wanted it to be open-ended. 
